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Abstract 
Voluntary environmental management programs for firms have become an increasingly popular 
instrument of environmental policy. However, the literature’s conclusion on the effectiveness of such 
programs is ambiguous, and for the European region there is a lack of evidence based on a large control 
group. We seek to fill this gap with an evaluation of the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), 
introduced in 1995 by the European Union as a premium certification of continuous pro-environmental 
efforts above regulatory minimum standards. It is more demanding than other voluntary programs 
due to annual public reports of the environmental performance and targets for improvements. We use 
official firm-level production census data on the German manufacturing sector, a major energy 
consumer and emitter in Europe. To account for the self-selection of firms, we combine the Coarsened 
Exact Matching approach with a Difference-in-Differences estimation. Our results do not suggest 
reductions of firms’ CO2 intensity and energy intensity neither before nor after certification. Moreover, 
program participants do not increase renewable energy consumption or investments into the 
protection of the environment and climate. Our results are robust to a variety of checks and call into 
question the effectiveness of the EMAS program concerning these particular outcome variables. 
Highlights:  
- We evaluate the EMAS program in Germany using production census firm-level data. 
- Matching Difference-in-Differences estimation accounts for self-selection of firms. 
- The program mainly attracts large and energy-intensive producers. 
- We find no impact on CO2 and energy intensity, renewable usage or eco-investments.  
Keywords: Voluntary Environmental Programs; Firm-level Energy Behavior; Matching Difference-in-
Differences 
JEL classification: Q58, Q54, Q48  
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1) Introduction 
 
Next to the deployment of renewable energy sources, a more efficient use of energy is essential for 
reaching national climate policy targets as committed under the Paris Agreement. Energy efficiency 
improvements are the main factor that attenuates global greenhouse gas emissions growth, 
counteracting rising energy demand due to income and population growth (IEA, 2017). 
From a firm perspective, an efficient use of energy is incentivized by energy costs and environmental 
regulation, such as fuel taxes, standards or emissions trading. However, empirical studies also highlight 
the role of management quality and practices for industrial energy efficiency and respective CO2 
emissions (Bloom et al., 2010, Martin et al., 2012, Boyd and Curtis, 2014, Löschel et al., 2017). In the 
economics literature, untapped potential for cost-efficient energy savings is often denoted as an 
“energy-efficiency gap” (IEA, 2015, Jaffe and Stavins, 1994, Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). Common 
explanations for the existence of this phenomenon are imperfect information, transaction costs, as 
well as uncertainty about future energy costs and regulation (Gerarden et al., 2017).  
Voluntary environmental management programs for firms are a popular instrument of environmental 
policy as an alternative to more stringent regulations. The core idea is to provide a credible certification 
of firms’ pro-environmental efforts and overcompliance with regulatory minimum standards. An 
underlying assumption is that firms would profit from an environmentally friendly image, e.g. by 
tapping into consumers’ willingness to pay for environmentally friendly production. Such management 
programs should then reduce remaining inefficiencies in resource usage and spur pro-environmental 
behavior at low enforcement costs (Barla, 2007). In this paper, we examine whether voluntary 
programs effectively reduce energy use and respective CO2 emissions by firms. 
The Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) certification for plants is a prime example of a 
voluntary measure. The program addresses the complete environmental footprint of an organization, 
i.e. local air, water, noise and land pollution as well as energy use and resulting greenhouse gas 
emissions. Introduced by the European Union (EU) in 1995, EMAS is subject to the legal system of the 
EU and its member states, in contrast to a private sector initiative. For certification, a plant requires 
an initial assessment of its environmental impact, an environmental policy for the plant, and an action 
plan for improvements. However, what distinguishes EMAS as being more demanding than other 
voluntary programs is the obligation to publish annual reports on the environmental performance. 
Therein plants have to define own targets for improvements and explicitly state strategies and 
measures to achieve these targets. The program does not prescribe the ambitiousness of these targets, 
which may lead to certification despite a business-as-usual effort. Yet, the commitment and a 
systematic review of the plant’s resource usage may ultimately translate into improvements.  
Despite a growing impact evaluation literature, the conclusion on the effectiveness of such voluntary 
programs is ambiguous. The wide heterogeneity in program design, pollutants addressed and distinct 
regional and institutional settings make it hard to generalize the results. Well-studied programs include 
the U.S. EPA’s 33/50 (e.g. Arora and Cason, 1996, Carrión-Flores et al., 2013, Gamper-Rabindran, 2006, 
Khanna and Damon, 1999, Vidovic and Khanna, 2007) and the private sector ISO14001 norm (e.g. 
Arimura et al., 2008, Barla, 2007, Nakamura et al., 2001). For the Strategic Goals program among firms 
in the U.S. metal industry, Brouhle et al. (2009) report little, if any, additional emissions reductions. 
Dasgupta et al. (2000) suggest that subsidies for environmental management in Mexico were beneficial 
for compliance, whereas Blackman et al. (2010) find no lasting impact of the Mexican Clean Industry 
Program on environmental performance.  
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These studies mostly investigate the effect on toxic releases as well as local air and water pollution, 
and find mixed results. The overall conclusion for the effectiveness of programs with a particular focus 
on greenhouse gas emissions is, however, less promising. For the U.S. programs Climate Wise and 
1605(b), Pizer et al. (2011) find no substantial effects on firm emissions and energy costs respectively. 
Kim and Lyon report that 1605(b) program participants even increased their CO2 intensity while 
reporting reductions. A study on the Canadian Greenhouse Gas program VCR asserts no difference in 
reported emissions at the end of the program period (Brouhle and Harrington, 2010).  
For the European region, the empirical evidence for voluntary programs is rather scarce. This is 
surprising given that the EU is considered as a major industrial economy with relatively stringent 
environmental policy in place (Bracke et al., 2008). The EMAS program has been subject to a variety of 
prior studies, yet to the best of our knowledge, there is no study evaluating participation with actual 
data on environmental performance. Bracke et. al (2008) investigate decisive financial characteristics 
of European firms for EMAS based on Bureau-van-Dijk firm-level data. Several studies evaluate EMAS 
via firm surveys with self-reported evidence, e.g. regarding product and process innovations (Frondel 
et al., 2004, Rennings et al., 2006) or managers’ perception of the program’s effectiveness (Iraldo et 
al., 2009), and generally find a positive influence on environmental innovations and performance. 
We seek to fill this gap with an assessment of the program’s effectiveness regarding firms’ actual 
environmental performance. Our evaluation of the voluntary EMAS program also delivers policy 
relevant insights for the latest German climate policy measure that mandates energy audits for large 
firms in Germany since 2015 (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 2014, §§ 8 - 8d EDL-G, 
and Article 8 of the EU Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU)). As the empirical evidence for such 
mandatory audits is scarce (e.g. Fleiter et al., 2012a, Fleiter et al., 2012b) and EMAS certification fulfills 
the requirements, our study of a voluntary audit program may provide insight into the potential impact 
of mandatory audits. Although EMAS targets a variety of environmental indicators, we investigate CO2 
and energy intensity as the main outcome, as well as the use of renewable energy and investments 
into environmental protection. Our analysis focuses on the German manufacturing sector, which is 
directly responsible for at least 20% of national Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Federal Environment 
Agency 2016a). For that purpose we link the EMAS Register with the official firm-level production 
census dataset AFiD (Amtliche Firmendaten für Deutschland – Official firm data for Germany) provided 
by the Research Data Centre of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder. Our 
firm panel covers the years 1995-2014 and contains a wide set of economic indicators, energy 
consumption by energy source and environmental protection investment activity. This highly reliable 
dataset is confidential and has been utilized for previous studies on the effects of energy and climate 
policy (e.g. Löschel et al., 2018, Lutz, 2016).  
In order to assess the EMAS program it is necessary to understand why a plant or firm may expect a 
positive net benefit of participation and what kind of firms select to enter the program. Our summary 
statistics show that the covariate distribution across participation status differs substantially. Firms 
with EMAS certified plants are larger, more energy and emissions intensive and show larger revenues 
and exports than non-certified firms do. Especially in early years, the program attracted firms with high 
policy relevance, i.e. relatively large energy consumers and emitters. The share of multinational 
corporations with multiple plants is larger among EMAS participants. Often, these firms have their own 
electricity generation capacities and a higher propensity to invest into the protection of the 
environment and climate.   
To account for observable differences in characteristics of certified and non-certified firms, our 
empirical strategy is to pre-process the data (Ho et al., 2007) via matching. We then estimate the 
Difference-in-Differences of outcomes, as this method has become well established in the program 
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evaluation literature (e.g. Blackman et al., 2010, Fowlie et al., 2012, and Löschel et al., 2018). We apply 
the Coarsened Exact Matching approach as proposed by Iacus et al. (2011, 2012), who show that its 
statistical properties are preferable to other matching methods, such as Propensity Score Matching 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) or Nearest-Neighbor Matching.  
Overall, we find no robust evidence of an effect on CO2 intensity and energy intensity. One explanation 
for our findings might be that EMAS firms do not mainly target energy usage and CO2 emissions with 
EMAS. Instead, participants may focus their efforts on other pollutants addressed by the program, such 
as local air, water and land pollution, which we do not observe in our dataset. However, we also find 
no robust evidence of higher investments into the protection of the environment and climate by EMAS 
firms. The same holds for the use of renewable energy sources. A conservative interpretation of our 
findings is that the effectiveness of EMAS – above and beyond other (unobservable) certification 
schemes such as ISO 14001 - is questionable.  
The analysis continues with a description of the EMAS program and insights from existing research on 
voluntary measures. In Section 3, we present the data and explain our empirical approach. In Section 
4, we present and discuss the main results and Section 5 provides checks for robustness. Section 6 
discusses the findings. 
 
2) The EMAS program 
 
The Eco Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) was developed by the European Commission (Council 
Regulation No 1836/93) and implemented in Germany in 1995.1 EMAS is a public voluntary regulation 
that is integrated in the legal system of the EU and its member states, in contrast to other private 
sector initiatives like the ISO 14001 norm.  
An EMAS certification requires an initial inspection of the plant site by an external auditor with a 
systematic review of the plant’s environmental impact regarding resource usage and emissions. On 
this basis, the plant has to set up an environmental management system, essentially a management 
tool that is based on the Plan–Do–Check–Act cycle with the following steps: Step 1 (Plan): defining an 
environmental policy with targets and projects, Step 2 (Do): operational implementation and 
appointment of an environmental officer in charge and involvement of employees, Step 3 (Check): 
management review of progress, and Step 4 (Act): taking corrective action where necessary.  
This subset of requirements is similar to the more popular ISO 14001 certification 2  and was 
harmonized under the EMAS II revision (EG Nr. 761/2001). Whereas ISO 14001 is often considered a 
necessity in the market place, EMAS is generally perceived as the “premium” certification and a 
stronger signal for actual environmental responsibility (Neugebauer, 2012, Bracke et al., 2008, Arimura 
                                                          
1 Gesetz zur Ausführung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1221/2009 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 
25. November 2009 über die freiwillige Teilnahme von Organisationen an einem Gemeinschaftssystem für 
Umweltmanagement und Umweltbetriebsprüfung und zur Aufhebung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 761/2001, sowie 
der Beschlüsse der Kommission 2001/681EG und 2006/193/EG.  The EMAS certification system is administered 
by the Umweltgutachterausschuss, a subsidiary of the Federal Ministry of the Environment. EMAS auditors also 
need to be accredited by the DAU GmbH (Deutsche Akkreditierungs- und Zulassungsgesellschaft für 
Umweltgutachter mbH). 
2 Because of relatively larger effort and costs, the number of EMAS registered organizations in Germany as of 
2017 (about 1,213, EMAS Register) is smaller than ISO14001 certifications (about 8,000, Federal Environment 
Agency, 2017). According to a survey by the Federal Environment Agency (2013), about half of EMAS participants 
are also ISO14001 certified. 
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et al., 2011). This is owing to its additional requirements: EMAS application further demands annual 
public reports on the current environmental performance and the definition of own targets for 
improvements and statements of particular strategies for achievement. Reports have to be accessible 
to the public and updated annually. Compliance with self-set targets is mandatory for continuous 
certification. The plant enters the EMAS Register when the initial statement is positively evaluated for 
plausibility by external auditors. Each year, the environmental reports are to be validated and the plant 
is to be inspected every three years.  
In phone interviews with several auditors as of February 2018, we gained a better understanding of 
the certification routine and best practice examples. Participating firms are encouraged to increase 
their ambition if auditors find targets to be in reach under business-as-usual effort. However, it was 
pointed out that, rather than the targets, the program takes effect from the commitment to allocate 
extra resource to exploring means of improvement and setting timelines. Further, it was stated that 
firms do not immediately lose their certification when a target is missed, as long as the firm can 
plausibly explain the reason to the auditor, e.g. due to an increase in production or higher than 
expected costs. Potentially, such shortcomings can be compensated by further efforts in other parts 
of the environmental strategy. Almost all firms leaving the program were said to do so owing to the 
costs of staying in the program, which is essentially larger for small and medium enterprises. However, 
the EMAS certification is invalidated when a violation of environmental laws is detected.  
With the latest EMAS III revision (EG Nr. 1221/2009), that came into effect in January 2010, the 
reporting of environmental performance was harmonized with key performance indicators, e.g. energy 
use or greenhouse gas emissions, and the program was no longer restricted to EU member states. 
Reasons for participation 
In order to assess the EMAS program it is necessary to understand why firms would expect a positive 
net benefit from participation and what kind of firms are attracted to the voluntary program. 
In a survey by the Federal Environment Agency (2013), German EMAS manufacturing firms state initial 
costs stated of 20K€ at the median and ranging up to 75K€ for larger firms. Estimated variable costs 
are less than 10K€ on average and only exceeds 20K€ for 20% of respondents.3 In contrast, average 
estimated cost savings are more than 10K€ per year, also increasing with firm size, and mostly 
attributed to improved resource efficiency, especially regarding energy usage. 
The existing literature suggests that firms mainly join EMAS due to firm internal motivation or due to 
regulatory incentives. In interviews with managers of German EMAS organizations, Neugebauer (2012) 
reports that the main reasons for participation are firm reputation, precautions regarding regulatory 
inspections or stakeholder demands. In an OECD survey covering German manufacturing firms in 
EMAS, Frondel et al. (2004) report ensuring regulatory compliance as the main reason for adoption, 
partly owing to the principle of strict liability in Germany. Other important motives are the firm 
reputation, incident prevention and cost-savings due to improved resource efficiency. Bracke et al. 
(2008) investigate the role of financial characteristics for EMAS participation among European firms 
and find that the program mainly attracts large firms with a sound financial structure and above 
                                                          
3 Empirical investigations of stock market reactions to other voluntary environmental actions by firms do not 
show a clearly positive picture (Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011, Ziegler et al. 2011) which is why shareholder 
wealth maximization may not necessarily be a prime reason for EMAS participation. 
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average labor costs. This is in line with the Frondel et al. (2004) and the summary statistics of our 
sample (see Section 3).4  
In an own survey of 140 EMAS firms in the German manufacturing sector we asked for their main 
reasons to participate (Kube and Capellen, 2017). The most frequently stated answers are corporate 
identity and a credible certification of pro-environmental efforts, optimized documentation, 
expectations from business customers, regulatory compliance, workplace safety and government 
incentives. As in Frondel et al. (2004), the initiative for participation often came from internal 
stakeholders, foremost the corporate management. 
EMAS participation is currently incentivized via regulatory facilitations. In fact, German participants 
face less documentation effort and fewer inspections, e.g. regarding wastewater and recycling (WHG, 
BImSchG, KrWG). Since 2012, energy intensive firms applying for an exemption from the renewable 
energy surcharge on electricity prices (EEG) additionally require EMAS or alternative certifications of 
their energy management systems. Similar rules have been introduced regarding the reduced 
electricity tax rate in 2013 (EnergieStG), and EMAS participants are exempt from energy audits that 
are mandatory for large firms since 2015.  
In the next Section, we present our data and discuss our empirical strategy to evaluate the impact of 
EMAS on manufacturing firms’ environmental performance. 
 
3) Materials and method 
 
3.1 Data   
Various datasets are combined for our analysis. First, from the official EMAS Register lists we collect 
all certified plants as of March 2016 in different manufacturing sectors (see Appendix A). We obtain 
the respective firms’ trade register numbers from the Hoppenstedt Firm Information Database and 
VAT numbers from company websites in order to append EMAS participation status to our main 
dataset: the German production census data AFiD (Amtliche Firmendaten für Deutschland – Official 
firm data for Germany) provided by the Research Data Centre of the Federal Statistical Office and 
Statistical Offices of the Länder. This highly reliable dataset is confidential and thus only accessible to 
approved researchers for scientific purposes. It has been utilized for previous studies on the effects of 
energy and climate policy (e.g. Löschel et al., 2018, Lutz, 2016, Petrick and Wagner, 2014). Our firm 
panel covers the years 1995-2014 and comes in a modular structure as follows: 
The AFiD-Panel Industrial Units is built upon the German Production Census, the Monthly Report on 
Plant Operation and the Investment Census. Participation is mandatory for all plants within 
manufacturing firms that have at least 20 employees. From the plant-level panel we obtain economic 
variables such as the number of Employees (our proxy of firm size), Revenue (in 1000€) and Gross 
Output (in 1000€). We define Export Ratio as the value of exports divided by the value of total revenue. 
Further, a dummy (Multi-plant firm) distinguishes firms consisting of more than one plant. 
Appended at the plant-level, the AFiD-Module Use of Energy provides consumption data (in kWh) for 
electricity and 14 different fuel types, e.g. natural gas, coal and oil products. Thus we obtain the total 
Energy Consumption (in MWh) and we define Energy Intensity as the total Energy Consumption (MWh) 
                                                          
4 Even in the U.S., Videras and Alberini (2000) find that large firms are systematically more likely to join different 
EPA voluntary programs (Green Lights, WasteWi$e and 33/50), regardless of program requirements and 
pollutants covered, presumably due to receiving more attention from consumers and regulators. 
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per Gross Output (in 1000€). As in Löschel et al. (2018), the fuel-specific data allows us to estimate 
direct CO2 Emissions of the firm (see Appendix B). We define CO2 Intensity as respective CO2 Emissions 
(in tons) per Gross Output (in 1000€). Further, we use a dummy (Fossil) to indicate firms that generate 
own electricity from fossil fuels or fuel switching options (i.e. firms using fossil fuels apart from natural 
gas and oil for heating purposes, but rather also coal, lignite or process gas and others). 
Available since the year 2003, the AFiD-Module Environmental Protection Investments comprises the 
value of investments into the protection of the environment (Air, Water, Waste, Noise, Nature & 
Landscape, Soil, and Noise) and climate (Energy Efficiency, Greenhouse Gas Mitigation, Renewable 
Energy). This way we use dummies to indicate firms using renewable energy (Renewables), e.g. by 
solar, wind and hydropower, as well as firms that made any investment into the protection of the 
environment and climate (Eco-Investments). 
From the EMAS Register as of March 2016 we obtain a sample of 423 plants within 271 firms with at 
least 20 employees operating within selected industries of the German manufacturing sector that were 
certified between 1995 and 2013 (see Appendix A). Out of these, we could identify 208 firms within 
the AFiD data. We aggregate the plant data to the firm level to account for potential spillover effects 
and specific internal accounting methods. Hence, a firm is coded as newly EMAS certified in the year 
that a firm’s first plant enters the EMAS Register. Furthermore, a firm is coded as EMAS certified even 
if just one of its plants are certified.5 
All monetary variables are deflated to 2010 levels for each 2-digit level industry via the index of 
producer prices for industrial products on industry.6 
We reduce the dataset to sectors with our EMAS participants and exclude outliers, i.e. observations 
where values of CO2 intensity or energy intensity are above the respective 99th percentile. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 1, we show the number of newly certified firms over years that could be identified in our AFiD 
panel dataset. The program quickly attracted firms initially, but certification rates have slowed down 
since the year 2000. Presumably owing to government incentives for large energy consuming firms (as 
discussed in the previous Section), the rates increased again after 2010. The majority of certified firms 
operate in the industries fabricated metals, chemicals, machinery, rubber and plastic, and automotive.  
In Table 2, we display the summary statistics for the years 2000 and 2010 by certification status. A key 
insight is that, especially in its first years, the program was able to attract policy relevant firms, i.e. 
large, energy and emission intensive firms with more revenue and exports than the average firm. 
Participants are often multinational firms with multiple plants and already invest into the protection 
of the environment and climate. They are also more likely to have own electricity generation capacities 
and/or use fossil fuels (such as coal, lignite or liquefied natural gas). Next, we describe our empirical 
strategy. 
                                                          
5 We merge the EMAS register to the census data based on a firm identifier. This makes it impossible to conduct 
the analysis at the plant level. However, the majority of the firms in our sample are single-plant firms and we 
carry out the analysis for these firms alone in our robustness checks. 
6 The price indices data is available on the website of the Federal Statistical Office: 
https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online (Producer Price Index 61241-0003). From 2009 onwards, the 
industry classification of the dataset is based on NACE rev. 2. In earlier years, the dataset is based on NACE rev 
1.1 which we manually transfer to NACE rev. 2 via four-digit industry codes and the official reclassification guide 
of the German statistical offices. 
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Table 1: Number of firms by EMAS certification status across 2-digit industries in selected years. 
 Non-certified firms  EMAS certified firms 
Industry (NACE classification)           /                   Year 2000 2005 2010 2013 2000 2005 2010 2013 
17) Paper and paper products 785 740 707 679 4 5 6 10 
20) Chemicals and chemical products 924 988 994 1,053 19 31 35 41 
21) Pharmaceutical products 227 228 221 237 5 5 6 5 
22) Rubber and plastic products 2,634 2,561 2,591 2,698 10 13 19 25 
23) Other nonmetallic mineral products 1,812 1,446 1,330 1,363 3 3 5 5 
24) Basic metals 866 820 822 818 6 6 9 12 
25) Fabricated metal products 6,151 5,889 6,299 6,669 23 34 48 57 
28) Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 5,214 4,915 4,955 5,154 15 21 28 33 
29) Motor vehicles and trailers 968 982 970 956 8 12 16 20 
Total 19,581 18,569 18,889 19,627 93 130 172 208 
Note: (Source: Research Data Centre of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Official Firm Data 
for Germany (AFiD) – AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, AFiD Module Use of Energy, AFiD Module Environmental Protection 
Investments, survey years 1995-2014, own calculations). 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for firms by EMAS certification status in the respective years 2000 and 2010.  
 
Year 2000 Year 2010 
 Certified Non-certified Certified Non-certified 
Covariate Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Energy Consumption (MWh) 40,803 12,285 6,045 949 38,313 13,822 7,112 1,278 
Energy Intensity (MWh/1000€) 0.46 0.24 0.32 0.14 0.49 0.27 0.35 0.18 
CO2 Emissions (t) 24,544 8,583 3,563 436 24,462 6,113 3,981 538 
CO2 Intensity (t/1000€) 0.23 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.08 
Employees (Firm size) 8,436 3,400 1,602 671 5868 2,404 1,547 694 
Revenue (1000 €) 141,160 59,313 24,779 7,423 112,566 40,326 27,418 7,775 
Export Ratio (%) 0.30 0.26 0.19 0.09 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.16 
Renewables (dummy) - - - - 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Fossil (dummy) 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.00 
Eco-Investments (dummy) - - - - 0.22 0.00 0.12 0.00 
Multi-plant firm (dummy) 0.25 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Nr. of observations 93 19,581 172 18,889 
Note: Covariates Renewables and Eco-investments are only available since the year 2003 (Source: Research Data Centre of 
the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) – AFiD-Panel 
Industrial Units, AFiD Module Use of Energy, AFiD Module Environmental Protection Investments, survey years 1995-2014, 
own calculations). 
 
3.3 Empirical strategy 
Formally, we are interested in the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), which we infer by 
using non-certified firms as counterfactual observations for EMAS participants. However, as firms 
voluntarily adopt EMAS we have to deal with the problem of self-selection (Heckman, 1979).  
In previous evaluations of voluntary programs, the favored identification strategy is an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach, such as in Anton et al. (2004), Arimura et al. (2008), Arora and Cason (1996), 
Barla (2007), Bui and Kapon (2012), Carrión-Flores et al. (2013), Khanna and Damon (1999), Nishitani 
(2011), or Vidovic and Khanna (2007). Popular instruments are governmental encouragement to 
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program participation, prior participation in other environmental programs, or the frequency of 
inspections and fines. However, the extent to which such instruments are truly exogenous will vary 
from case to case. In our study, variables that could serve as instruments are not available. Prior 
certification in other programs such as ISO14001, could certainly exert explanatory power for EMAS 
participation, but it would be hard to argue that there were no direct effects from prior programs on 
the outcome variables, i.e. CO2 and energy intensity. There is also no official ISO14001 register for 
Germany. 
For these reasons, our empirical strategy is a pre-processing of the dataset (Ho et al., 2007) via the 
Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) approach proposed by Iacus et al. (2011, 2012), before running a 
Difference-in-Differences regression. The CEM algorithm stratifies matching covariates – binary or 
continuous - into bins, and each participant is matched to all observations that are in exactly the same 
bins for all matching covariates. Its non-parametric nature accounts for higher moments of covariates 
and reduces model dependence. By definition, it yields strong balance in covariates and lower root 
mean square error than existing approaches, such as Propensity Score Matching or Nearest-Neighbor 
Matching (Iacus, 2011, 2012). CEM has been successfully applied in previous studies, e.g. on the 
effectiveness of energy audits (Schleich and Fleiter, 2017) or spillover effects from municipal green-
building procurement (Simcoe and Toffel, 2014). In the program evaluation literature, the Matching-
Difference-in-Differences approach has in general become well established and is used in studies such 
as Blackman et al. (2010), Fowlie et al. (2012), or Löschel et al. (2018).  
Once certified, firms generally remain in the program, which is in favor of our matching approach 
modeling participation as a one-time decision. The identifying assumption is that conditional on the 
matching covariates, the firm’s decision to participate in EMAS is as good as random. Inferring the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) via Difference-in-Differences “… permits selection to be 
based on potential program outcomes and allows for selection on unobservables.” (Heckman et al., 
1997). It is valid under the assumption that outcome trends would be equal for both groups in the 
absence of participation in the program. We test this assumption by assessing the changes in CO2 
intensity from four and three years prior to certification, in years most likely prior to the participation 
decision. Overall, these are not different across certification status groups (see Appendix C), which is 
in favor of our approach.  
Matching covariates 
We match firms newly certified with EMAS in a given year to firms that are not certified in the same 
year. The matching algorithm is based on a vector of lagged firm-specific characteristics from pre-
certification periods, of which some proxy the firm’s “greenness”. The average duration from the 
decision to participate until certification takes place, is 15 months and less than 24 months for almost 
all respondents in a government survey (Federal Environment Agency, 2013).7 Thus we use covariate 
values from three years prior to certification that are, most likely, exogenous to the participation 
decision. Our approach is related to Brand and Xie (2007) and illustrated in Figure 1. If a firm is certified 
in an arbitrary year t4 then we assume it decided to participate in year t2 and match based on covariate 
values from year t1. 
                                                          
7 Alternatively, we could use the covariate average over more previous years, but this would critically reduce our 
sample size and also not account for most recent dynamics of the firms. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the dynamic matching structure for firms certified in arbitrarily chosen period t4.   
 
Note: (Source: own illustration based on Brand and Xie (2007)). 
We select the matching covariates that have been shown as most relevant in the previously discussed 
literature and our own pre-study survey (Kube and Capellen, 2017).  
First, we include the log of Energy Consumption and the CO2 Intensity as determinants of the 
environmental impact and costs associated with resource usage.8    
Financial capabilities to install and maintain a certified environmental management system are proxied 
via Revenue. We also include the share of revenue from exports (Export Ratio), as Richter and Schiersch 
(2017) show that a higher export intensity is associated with significantly lower emissions intensity for 
German manufacturing firms. A global market scope may also come along with additional pressure 
from international stakeholders to manage environmental impacts and certify a sustainable 
production (Khanna and Anton, 2002). 
Environmental management systems may also be more attractive for firms with own electricity 
generation and with an option for fuel switching decisions, which we indicate with a dummy (Fossil). 
From 2003 onwards, we proxy awareness regarding low-carbon alternatives and pro-environmental 
attitudes of the firm via dummies that indicate usage of renewable energy (Renewables) and 
investments into the protection of the environment and climate (Eco-Investments).  
Outcome estimation 
Based on the matched sample we assess the program’s impact on firms’ environmental performance 
by comparing the changes in outcomes across participant status. Although EMAS addresses various 
environmental externalities, we focus on CO2 and energy intensity, and further assess the usage of 
renewable energy and investments into the protection of the environment and climate. Formally, we 
estimate the Difference-in-Differences of outcomes (Heckman et al., 1997, 1998) via the following 
regression:  
                                                          
8 Although this implies a double-counting of intermediate goods, we prefer gross output over value added since 
gross output better reflects disembodied technological change and does not assume separability between 
intermediate goods and value added. At last, the dataset only provides value added data for a subset of firms 
with more than 500 employees, which would drastically reduce the number of observations for our purpose. 
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∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ø𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ +  𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕′ +  𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖  + 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    ,                                                      (1)     
where ∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ is the change in outcomes (e.g. CO2 intensity) of firm 𝑖𝑖 in industry 𝑠𝑠 from certification year 
𝑡𝑡 towards a certain pre- or post-certification year 𝑡𝑡∗. We estimate effects starting from two years prior 
to certification until four years post certification, because firms will exert effort to assure a certification 
and because participation may require time and experience to translate into improvements. We also 
investigate the change from four and three years prior to certification in order to test the validity of 
the Difference-in-Differences estimation, which depends upon the common trend assumption. 
The dummy 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is equal to one if the firm was EMAS certified in year 𝑡𝑡. The 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ dummy is 
equal to one if the firm was eligible for exemptions from the renewable energy surcharge at year 𝑡𝑡’, 
which is three years prior to certification year 𝑡𝑡.9 This way we control for the possibility that eligibility 
may have encouraged EMAS certification and further incentives for energy saving behavior, or in the 
case of the EEG exemption, the reverse (Gerster, 2017). We also include the vector of lagged matching 
covariates 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕′ to control for remaining variation despite matching. In order to account for industry 
heterogeneity we only match firms in the same 2-digit industry. We further include year-dummies 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 
and state-dummies 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐. Standard errors 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are i.i.d.  
In our baseline analysis, we exclude multi-plant firms because EMAS certification of a plant may exert 
less precisely estimable effects in firms with multiple plants, where not necessarily all plants are 
certified. One of our robustness checks in Section 5 is to run the CEM regressions also including multi-
plant firms. Owing to a structural change in the energy statistics in 2003, we split the sample and 
estimate the models using two sub-samples: years 1995-2002 and years 2003-2014. Accordingly we 
only estimate the effect for firms that were certified in years 1996-2002 and 2003-2013 respectively.10 
Another challenge to our analysis is the fact that the EMAS Register only lists currently registered 
organizations, i.e. that we cannot observe firms that left the program before 2016. In a phone 
interview with the German EMAS Register Helpdesk (as of March 2016), we were assured that dropout 
numbers are especially low among manufacturing firms.11 Still, this issue may affect the Stable Unit 
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) if EMAS dropouts are by chance matched as control units. 
However, we minimize this potential risk by including a large number of control units, also in the CEM-
matched sample.  
In Table 3, we display the number of observations available for the regressions, i.e. observations with 
lagged covariate values, separately for newly certified firms and non-certified firms in the respective 
sub-periods. In the first sub-period, there are 67 EMAS certified firms with lagged covariate values. Out 
of these, CEM could match 64 to 7,960 control firms. In the second sub-period, there are 49 newly 
certified firms with lagged covariate values. Out of these, 46 could be matched to 5,533 control firms. 
                                                          
9 Since 2008, energy intensive firms (energy consumption >10 GWh/a) that are eligible for an exemption also  
require an energy management system certification like EMAS, ISO14001, ISO16001, or a comparable 
certification by an external auditor (EEG 2009). Since 2012, only EMAS or ISO50001 are accepted certifications 
(EEG 2012). However, among the firms that were EMAS certified between 2008 and 2013, only nine firms are on 
the list of firms exempt from the surcharge between 2010 and 2013. Similarly, since 2013 energy intensive 
manufacturing firms applying for a reduced electricity tax rate also require EMAS or a comparable energy 
management system certification such as ISO50001. However, all new EMAS participants from 2013 onwards in 
our dataset exceed the threshold electricity consumption.  
10 Matching firms on lagged covariates forces us to drop plants that joined in 1995, losing four participant 
observations. However, we do not drop firms that joined in 1996 and 1997, where we only have a one-year and 
two-year lag available because of the program’s rapid introduction, which lowers the risk of firms changing their 
behavior in anticipation of the program. We also leave out firms certified in 2014 since we cannot estimate post-
certification effects for these participants.  
11 In phone interviews with EMAS auditors (as of February 2018), we were assured that firms mainly decided to 
leave EMAS due to its running costs, not because of new requirements following the revisions in 2001 and 2010.  
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Owing to the large number of control units, we are confident that EMAS dropouts do not hamper our 
analysis. In the last two columns the same figures are shown for the subsample of a robustness check 
where we do not exclude multi-plant firms (see Section 5).  
Table 3: Number of observations with lagged covariate values per sub-period in the full sample and CEM matched sample, 
over all sectors, both excluding and including multi-plant firms.  
Given these data limitations and the missing information on certification according to ISO14001 our 
findings should conservatively be interpreted as the net effect of adopting EMAS beyond any such pro-
environmental efforts of the firms that we cannot observe. 
 
4) Main results and discussion 
 
We now turn to the regressions of our main outcomes within the preferred CEM-matched sample of 
single-plant firms only (Table 4). For brevity, we only report the EMAS coefficients as well as the 
respective standard errors and p-values of each regression. 
CO2 intensity 
The first two outcome columns in Table 4 show estimates of the average difference in the change of 
log CO2 intensity across participation status (Difference-in-Differences) over certain years before/after 
certification. Results are shown in separate columns for each sub-period. The first row (“2 Y prior”) 
reports the change from two years prior to certification to the year of certification, accounting for 
effort shortly after deciding to join EMAS. In the next row (“1 Y prior”), we measure the difference 
from one year prior to certification towards the year of certification. All further rows (“1 Y post” until 
“4 Y post”) below show the change from the year of certification to up to four years after certification. 
Owing to the large number of regressions, we only report the coefficient and respective significance 
levels.  
First, the CEM estimates generally show no significant effect of EMAS on participants’ CO2 intensity in 
either direction, and this finding is robust across periods. If they were significant, the point estimates 
would suggest a change in CO2 intensity of less than ten percent. 
Energy intensity 
Next, we assess whether participation had an effect on the energy intensity of production, i.e. energy 
consumption per unit of gross output. If this is the case, then potential improvements may just not 
have translated into a lower CO2 intensity for other reasons, such as changes in the fuel mix. 
However, the point estimates also suggest no significant impact of EMAS on firms’ energy intensity 
and closely resemble the findings for CO2 intensity. 
 Excluding multi-plant firms Including multi-plant firms 
Sub-period 1995-2002  2003-2014 1995-2002 2003-2014 
Newly certified firms 67 49 88 60 
Matched: 64 46 85 60 
Non-certified firms 98,942 161,217 109,128 178,337 
Matched: 7,960 5,533 10,177 6,343 
Note: (Source: Research Data Centre of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Official Firm Data 
for Germany (AFiD) – AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, AFiD Module Use of Energy, AFiD Module Environmental Protection 
Investments, survey years 1995-2014, own calculations).   
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Table 4: Main outcomes for the CEM matched sample, excluding multi-plant firms.  
Dep. Var. Log CO2 Intensity Log Energy Intensity Renewables 
Eco-
Investments 
Sub-period 1995-2002 2003-2014 1995-2002 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 
2 Y prior  0.045 -0.009 0.071 0.019 -4 13 
 (0.081) (0.061) (0.092) (0.066) (76) (24) 
1 Y prior  -0.022 0.044 0.000 0.055 -- -- 
 (0.061) (0.110) (0.070) (0.111)   
1 Y post -0.005 -0.031 -0.008 -0.014 20 -32 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.046) (0.046) (21) (30) 
2 Y post 0.044 0.008 0.036 0.010 -- -- 
 (0.049) (0.077) (0.056) (0.080)   
3 Y post 0.070 0.018 0.084 0.024 -- -- 
 (0.057) (0.067) (0.065) (0.073)   
4 Y post 0.025 0.082 0.040 0.112 -215 -23 
 (0.080) (0.068) (0.089) (0.073) (1112) (46) 
Note: Dependent variables are the change in log CO2 intensity and log energy intensity, as well as the usage of renewables (in 
MWh, aggregated over 3 years), and the investments into the protection of the environment and climate (in 1000€, 
aggregated over 3 years). The latter two outcome variables are only available since the year 2003 and results only shown for 
selected years due to the pre- and post-certification clustering. Standard errors are i.i.d. and shown in parentheses. P values: 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p< 0.01 (Source: Research Data Centre of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the 
Länder, Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) – AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, AFiD Module Use of Energy, AFiD Module 
Environmental Protection Investments, survey years 1995-2014, own calculations).  
Renewable energy consumption 
As another channel for environmental improvements, we assess whether EMAS led to an increasing 
use of renewable energy sources. We measure this outcome by aggregating the renewable energy 
usage in MWh (power and other renewable sources) over three years from different starting years 
onwards. That is, in the first row (“2 Y prior”) we measure the aggregate renewable energy usage in 
the two years prior to certification and the year of certification, and then estimate the average 
difference across participation status. Likewise the post-certification estimation “1 Y post” comprises 
the difference in aggregate renewable consumption in the first three years post certification, and “4 Y 
post“ considers the years 4-6 following certification.12 This way we separate pre- and post-certification 
outcomes. Owing to data availability, we can only analyze the sub-period 2003-2014. In general, we 
cannot conclude that EMAS certified firms increase their renewable consumption relative non-certified 
peers. 
Investments into the protection of the environment and climate 
Our last outcome variable concerns investments into the protection of the environment and climate. 
It comprises various measures to e.g. reduce air and water pollution or waste, as well as investments 
into energy efficiency. As such, a survey of German manufacturing firms by Löschel et al. (2017) reports 
a significant correlation between energy management practices and investments into energy saving 
technologies. Analogously to renewable energy consumption, we add up total investments (in 1000€) 
over three years beginning at different starting years.13 The variable is also only available from 2003 
                                                          
12 An alternative measuring via the share of energy from renewables was problematic due to many observations 
with a share of zero. 
13 As for renewables, relating the investment value to revenue would impede measuring changes due to zero 
values. 
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onwards. Again, we find no evidence of EMAS participation leading to an increasing investment 
activity.  
 
5) Robustness checks 
 
In order to assess the robustness of our findings, we complement our CEM-matched sample regression 
of single-plant firms with different specifications.14  
First, we run the regression of the CEM matched sample again but now do not exclude multi-plant 
firms anymore. In the first sub-period this yields 88 firms newly certified with EMAS. Out of these, 85 
were matched via the CEM algorithm to 10,177 control firms (see Table 3). In the second sub-period, 
there are 60 EMAS firms and all could be matched to 6,343 control firms. 
Second, we run an OLS regression on the full sample (excluding multi-plant firms) where we simply 
include the lagged covariates 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕′ from the CEM as controls: 
 ∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  ø𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ + 𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕′ +  𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖  + 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 + 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    .                                           (2)   
Note that instead of exact matching within the same 2-digit industry we now include 2-digit industry-
dummies 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖.  
At last, we run the OLS regression again but now also include the Propensity Score 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ as a covariate, 
following the methodology of Brouhle et al. (2009, 2010) and Khanna and Damon (1999):  
∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  ø𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ + 𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕′ + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖  + 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 + 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 +  𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    .                          (3)    
Therefore, we estimate the Propensity Score of participation based on the lagged covariates (as for 
the CEM matching) via a logit model (see Appendix D). Note that all single-plant observations with 
lagged covariate values are used in these OLS robustness checks. 
When we include multi-plant firms in the CEM matched sample regression (Table 5), the estimates 
mostly resemble findings from our preferred specification (Table 4). Nonetheless, the results suggest 
that firms increase their emissions intensity and energy intensity by about ten percent and more in the 
long run, both in the early and late sub-period, at a significance level of five percent. This result would 
question the program effectiveness, but it is not robust over varying years since certification and 
vanishes when we focus on single-plant firms. Results are robust for renewable usage and investments 
into the protection of the environment and climate.  
Estimates in the OLS regression (Table 6) and the OLS regression including the Propensity Score (Table 
7) are in line with the main regressions addressing the self-selection problem via a CEM-matched 
sample (both Table 4 and 5). If they were significant, point estimates for CO2 intensity and energy 
intensity would mostly suggest only minor changes shortly around certification, and increases by at 
least eight percent in the long run. Results for the two additional outcome variables (Renewables and 
Eco-Investments) are still insignificant, but the point estimates are somewhat larger than in the CEM 
matched sample regression.  
                                                          
14 In an earlier version, we also ran regressions for the 2-digit industry with the largest number of participants 
(Fabricated metal products). Results were, however, not significant for our main outcomes, which is why we did 
not include this test in the final version of the paper. 
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In general, the robustness checks are in line with the results of our preferred specification, where we 
cannot detect a substantial impact of EMAS certification on any of the four outcome variables. 
Table 5: Robustness check within the CEM sample matched – this time not excluding multi-plant firms. 
Dep. Var. Log CO2 Intensity Log Energy Intensity Renewables 
Eco-
Investments 
Sub-period 1995-2002 2003-2014 1995-2002 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 
2 Y prior  -0.007 -0.015 -0.003 0.044 -20 51 
 (0.057) (0.053) (0.064) (0.056) (146) (35) 
1 Y prior  -0.043 0.040 -0.015 0.060 -- -- 
 (0.040) (0.088) (0.045) (0.090)   
1 Y post -0.005 -0.025 -0.017 -0.008 15 19 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (126) (39) 
2 Y post 0.050 0.039 0.035 0.048 -- -- 
 (0.041) (0.064) (0.046) (0.063)   
3 Y post 0.108** 0.067 0.095* 0.076 -- -- 
 (0.050) (0.063) (0.057) (0.066)   
4 Y post 0.061 0.138** 0.083 0.151** -153 -17 
 (0.060) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (772) (83) 
Note: Dependent variables are the change in log CO2 intensity and log energy intensity, as well as the usage of renewables (in 
MWh, aggregated over 3 years), and the investments into the protection of the environment and climate (in 1000€, 
aggregated over 3 years). The latter two outcome variables are only available since the year 2003 and results only shown for 
selected years due to the pre- and post-certification clustering. Standard errors are i.i.d. and shown in parentheses. P values: 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p< 0.01 (Source: Research Data Centre of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the 
Länder, Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) – AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, AFiD Module Use of Energy, AFiD Module 
Environmental Protection Investments, survey years 1995-2014, own calculations). 
 
Table 6: Robustness check using OLS on the full sample excluding multi-plant firms.  
Dep. Var. Log CO2 Intensity Log Energy Intensity Renewables 
Eco-
Investments 
Sub-period 1995-2002 2003-2014 1995-2002 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 
2 Y prior  0.013 -0.008 0.016 0.044 -296 -56 
 (0.077) (0.070) (0.084) (0.076) (536) (85) 
1 Y prior  0.000 -0.017 0.011 0.001 -- -- 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.062) (0.065)   
1 Y post 0.022 -0.005 0.015 0.009 -254 -107 
 (0.069) (0.055) (0.076) (0.058) (4036) (106) 
2 Y post 0.089 0.060 0.097 0.073 -- -- 
 (0.086) (0.067) (0.096) (0.072)   
3 Y post 0.141 0.091 0.148 0.107 -- -- 
 (0.096) (0.073) (0.107) (0.078)   
4 Y post 0.121 0.108 0.165 0.138 -615 228 
 (0.103) (0.084) (0.115) (0.089) (5973) (162) 
Note: Dependent variables are the change in log CO2 intensity and log energy intensity, as well as the usage of renewables (in 
MWh, aggregated over 3 years), and the investments into the protection of the environment and climate (in 1000€, 
aggregated over 3 years). The latter two outcome variables are only available since the year 2003 and results only shown for 
selected years due to the pre- and post-certification clustering. Standard errors are i.i.d. and shown in parentheses. P values: 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p< 0.01 (Source: Research Data Centre of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the 
Länder, Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) – AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, AFiD Module Use of Energy, AFiD Module 
Environmental Protection Investments, survey years 1995-2014, own calculations).  
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Table 7: Robustness check using OLS and controlling for the Propensity Score on the full sample excluding multi-plant firms.  
Dep. Var. Log CO2 Intensity Log Energy Intensity Renewables 
Eco-
Investments 
Sub-period 1995-2002 2003-2014 1995-2002 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 
2 Y prior  0.020 -0.009 0.038 0.025 -262 -30 
 (0.088) (0.080) (0.096) (0.086) (440) (39) 
1 Y prior  -0.018 -0.016 -0.005 -0.005 -- -- 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.071) (0.072)   
1 Y post 0.006 -0.016 0.015 0.004 -163 -77 
 (0.079) (0.061) (0.088) (0.065) (4904) (50) 
2 Y post 0.091 0.063 0.120 0.080 -- -- 
 (0.100) (0.076) (0.111) (0.081)   
3 Y post 0.118 0.083 0.170 0.106 -- -- 
 (0.109) (0.082) (0.122) (0.087)   
4 Y post 0.116 0.095 0.170 0.135 -525 -83 
 (0.115) (0.095) (0.130) (0.101) (7153) (53) 
Note: Dependent variables are the change in log CO2 intensity and log energy intensity, as well as the usage of renewables (in 
MWh, aggregated over 3 years), and the investments into the protection of the environment and climate (in 1000€, 
aggregated over 3 years). The latter two outcome variables are only available since the year 2003 and results only shown for 
selected years due to the pre- and post-certification clustering. Standard errors are i.i.d. and shown in parentheses. P values: 
*: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p< 0.01 (Source: Research Data Centre of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the 
Länder, Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) – AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, AFiD Module Use of Energy, AFiD Module 
Environmental Protection Investments, survey years 1995-2014, own calculations).  
 
6) Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we investigate German manufacturing firms that are voluntarily certified with the 
environmental management system EMAS, and whether these firms show significant changes in their 
CO2 intensity and energy intensity relative to non-certified peers. Further, we investigate the impact 
of participation on the usage of renewable energy sources and investments into the protection of the 
environment and climate. We use the CEM approach to create a matched sample based on lagged 
covariates and estimate the Difference-in-Differences of outcomes via regression analysis. An 
assessment of CO2 intensity pre-trends shows no significant difference across participation status, 
which substantiates the validity of this approach. For robustness, we also run OLS regressions, with 
and without the Propensity Score for program participation.  
We focus on changes in outcomes both before and after certification. However, in general the results 
are insignificant. It may be the case that a demanding voluntary program like EMAS only leads to small 
improvements that we cannot detect in our data. Nonetheless, the results raise doubt about the 
program’s effectiveness.  
One explanation of our findings could be that participating firms actually detect further options for 
improvements due to the program, but that these measures are just not profitable under the current 
situation of low prices for energy and CO2 emissions. In a scenario of rising prices, a scheme like EMAS 
might thus unfold a stronger lever for environmental policy.  
On the other hand, EMAS participants are often large and energy intensive firms, that often have 
already implemented an energy management system. In that case, an additional EMAS certification 
may not provide additional improvements or information (European Environment Agency, 2008). As 
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such, almost half of EMAS participants are also certified with ISO14001, which in itself demands an 
environmental management system (Federal Environment Agency, 2013).  
Another reason for our findings may be that firms do not mainly improve energy usage and CO2 
emissions with EMAS. Instead, they may rather focus their efforts on other externalities such as air, 
water and land pollution or wastes, which we cannot observe in our dataset. However, we do not 
observe a significant increase of investments into the protection of the environment and climate or an 
increased use of renewable energy sources. Future work could involve pollution data to assess this 
question. 
Our findings are in line with the existing literature for other countries in raising doubt about the 
effectiveness of voluntary measures with respect to greenhouse gas emissions. Although EMAS does 
not primarily focus on energy and resulting emissions, it is among its key performance indicators and 
a salient option for action. With its implementation by the European Union, EMAS has the potential to 
substantiate a strong credibility of efforts. However, it is only one out of many certifications for firms’ 
pro-environmental efforts. Hence, further research on soft instruments is required to gain a more 
complete picture of the effectiveness of soft regulation.  
Finally, future research could investigate measures where firms participate by law, rather than by 
choice. Potentially, the effects of such policies are stronger as they may address firms with less 
knowledge about potential measures that ultimately translate into environmental improvements and 
cost savings.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: The EMAS Register sample  
The EMAS Register is an open access database provided by the Association of German Chambers of 
Industry and Commerce and provides a continuous register of EMAS participants. As of March 2016, 
we obtain a sample of 423 plants within 271 firms with at least 20 employees operating within large 
energy-consuming industries of the German manufacturing sector that were certified between 1995 
and 2013. We do not include firms certified in 2014, as our dataset would not allow an investigation 
of post-certification outcomes for these firms. Specifically, we have selected firms within the following 
NACE 2-digit industry sectors: 
17) Paper and paper products 
19) Coke and refined petroleum products 
20) Chemicals and chemical products 
21) Pharmaceutical products 
22) Rubber and plastic products 
23) Other nonmetallic mineral products 
24) Basic metals 
25) Fabricated metal products 
28) Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
29) Motor vehicles and trailers 
 
Figure A1 shows the annual increase and stock of EMAS registration. Almost half of participants joined 
before the year 2000 and registration rates are much lower ever since. A spike in 2011 coincided with 
EMAS becoming an eligibility criterion for the reduced electricity tax rate.  
Figure A1: Number of EMAS Registered plants per year (new registrations and stock) as of March 2016. 
 
Note: (Source: EMAS Register). 
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Appendix B: Estimating direct CO2 Emissions of energy consumption 
The AFiD-Module Use of Energy provides consumption data for electricity and eight different fuel 
types, e.g. natural gas, oil and coal products.  
We obtain fuel specific CO2 emission factors (see Table B1) by the Federal Environment Agency (Federal 
Environment Agency 2016a). In Table B1 we display the average CO2 emission factors over the years 
1995-2014, whereas deviations across years and industries not shown for brevity. 
The energy consumption variable for coal products, other mineral oil products and other gases are 
aggregated from more detailed fuels, which is why we weight the emission factor for each 3-digit 
industry and year according to the share the of subsumed fuels consumed in (AG Energiebilanzen). 
For electricity purchased from the grid, we refer to the CO2 emission factor by the Federal Environment 
Agency (2016b) that accounts for international trade effects. Own generation of electricity is 
accounted for by the fossil fuel consumption.  
We set the emission factor to zero for electricity from renewables (wind, solar, hydro) and other energy 
from renewable sources, e.g. usage of biofuels. 
For district heating, we refer to values from the Federal Environment Agency (2008). Following the 
recommendation from a personal consultation of staff via phone in March 2017, we take the value of 
2000 for 1995-2000, the value of 2005 for 2005-2014 and the mean of 2000-2005 for years 2001-2004.  
 
Table B1: Mean CO2 emission factors over years 1995-2014 for specific energy carriers in the AFiD dataset.  
Fuel Type 
 
Mean CO2 1995-2014 (g/kWh) 
Electricity (grid) 620.100 
Natural gas 211.910 
Light heating oil 266.471 
Heavy heating oil 287.387 
District heat 217.920 
Liquid gas 234.599 
Coal  337.366 
Coke 389.268 
Lignite raw 387.877 
Lignite briquetts 356.699 
Other mineral oil products 279.387 
Other gases 441.425 
Other coal products 354.937 
Other fuels and waste 264.703 
Renewables 0 
Note: (Source: Federal Environment Agency 2016a, 2016b, 2008, AG Energiebilanzen).  
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Appendix C: Pre-trend check for CO2 intensity 
Prior to our results, we test the validity of the Difference-in-Differences estimation, which depends on 
the common trend assumption. In Table C1, we compare changes in log CO2 intensity prior to the 
certification years across participation status. For example, row “1999” shows the change from 1995 
to 1996 (column “t-4 -> t-3”) and from 1996 to 1997 (column “t-3 -> t-2”), which is the time prior to 
firms’ participation decision (less than two years according to Federal Environment Agency, 2013).  
Overall, the t-tests for differences in mean trends are insignificant at the ten, five and one percent 
level (p-values not shown in Table C1 for brevity). This endorses our Difference-in-Differences 
estimation approach and that matching on the covariates prior to the participation decision accounts 
for the problem of endogeneity. 
Table C1: Pre-trends of log CO2 Intensity for firms certified with EMAS in a given year and firms not certified in that year.  
Certification year 
t-4 -> 
t-3 
t-3 -> 
t-2 
t-2 -> 
t-1  Certification year t-3 t-2 
1997 Certified   -0.03  2006 Certified 0.23 -0.02 
 Non-certified   0.08   Non-certified 0.16 0.06 
1998 Certified  -0.03   2007 Certified -0.02 0.01 
 Non-certified  -0.10    Non-certified -0.31 -0.01 
1999 Certified -0.03 -0.06   2008 Certified 0.01 -0.02 
 Non-certified 0.07 -0.10    Non-certified 0.08 -0.03 
2000 Certified -0.06 0.00   2009 Certified -0.03 -0.02 
 Non-certified -0.13 -0.04    Non-certified -0.04 -0.13 
2001 Certified 0.00 -0.02   2010 Certified -0.03 -0.02 
 Non-certified 0.05 0.01    Non-certified 0.14 0.06 
2002 Certified -0.02 -0.01   2011 Certified -0.02 0.07 
 Non-certified -0.07 -0.06    Non-certified -0.10 0.20 
2003 Certified -0.01 0.06   2012 Certified 0.07 -0.01 
 Non-certified 0.05 -0.04    Non-certified 0.27 -0.14 
2004 Certified 0.06 0.00   2013 Certified -0.01 -0.07 
 Non-certified 0.10 -0.11    Non-certified -0.02 -0.17 
2005 Certified 0.00 0.23       
 Non-certified -0.07 0.06       
Note: T-3 (t-2) are trends 3 (2) years prior to the respective certification year. For firms certified in 1997 we can only include 
the change 1 year prior to certification. P values: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p< 0.01. (Source: Research Data Centre of the 
Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Official Firm Data for Germany (AFiD) – AFiD-Panel Industrial 
Units, AFiD Module Use of Energy, AFiD Module Environmental Protection Investments, survey years 1995-2014, own 
calculations).   
 
  
27 
 
Appendix D: Estimating the Propensity Score of EMAS participation 
We estimate the Propensity Score, the probability to adopt EMAS in a given year 𝑡𝑡, based on the same 
lagged covariate vector Xist’ as for the CEM matching as: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐹𝐹(𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕′) + 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    ,                                                                                                                       (4)  
where 𝐹𝐹(∙) is the cumulative logistic distribution and 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an i.i.d. error term.  
Table D1 shows the respective logit estimation results.  
Table 8: Results of the Logit estimation of the participation decision (Propensity Score specification).  
Dependent Variable EMAS certification in given year 
Sub-period 1995-2002 2003-2014 
CO2 Intensity (ln) 
-0.875 -3.127** 
 
(0.684) (1.305) 
Energy (ln) 
0.830*** 0.804*** 
 
(0.158) (0.154) 
Revenue 
0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Export Ratio 
-1.950** -0.193 
 
(0.925) (0.651) 
Fossil + Eco-Investments + 
Renewables (dummy) 
(all three dummy variables 
comprised in one) 
0.000 -0.501 
 
(0.554) (0.408) 
EEG exemption eligibility 
(dummy) 
-- 0.061 
 
-- (0.545) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
State dummies Yes Yes 
N 
70,732 148,165 
Likelihood ratio 
77.95 69.99 
Prob > chi2 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Pseudo R^2 
0.1101 0.0792 
Note: Standard errors are i.i.d. We include a dummy that is equal to one if at least one of the dummy variables Fossil, 
Renewables or Eco-Investments is equal to one (the latter two are only available since 2003). P values: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, 
***: p< 0.01 (Source: Research Data Centre of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Official Firm 
Data for Germany (AFiD) – AFiD-Panel Industrial Units, AFiD Module Use of Energy, AFiD Module Environmental Protection 
Investments, survey years 1995-2014, own calculations).  
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